Thanks to recent advances in Deep Neural Networks (DNNs), face recognition systems have achieved high accuracy in classification of a large number of face images. However, recent works demonstrate that DNNs could be vulnerable to adversarial examples and raise concerns about robustness of face recognition systems. In particular adversarial examples that are not restricted to small perturbations could be more serious risks since conventional certified defenses might be ineffective against them. To shed light on the vulnerability of the face recognition systems to this type of adversarial examples, we propose a flexible and efficient method to generate unrestricted adversarial examples using image translation techniques. Our method enables us to translate a source into any desired facial appearance with large perturbations so that target face recognition systems could be deceived. We demonstrate through our experiments that our method achieves about 90% and 30% attack success rates under a white-and black-box setting, respectively. We also illustrate that our generated images are perceptually realistic and maintain personal identity while the perturbations are large enough to defeat certified defenses.
Introduction
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have gained lots of success by achieving accuracy better than human capability in fields of image classification [Krizhevsky et al., 2012] and machine translation [Bahdanau et al., 2014] . However, recent works demonstrate that DNNs could be vulnerable to adversarial examples [Szegedy et al., 2014; Carlini and Wagner, 2017] . Specifically, DNNs could be intentionally misled by an input data point that has been modified slightly. To understand the mechanism of the vulnerability and make DNNs more robust, it is significant to study methods to generate adversarial examples.
The vulnerability to adversarial examples raises concerns about face recognition systems widely used in practical * Equal contribution (a) Original (b) Adversarial (c) Target
Figure 1: Adversarial image translation against face recognition systems. Our method translates (a) the original images into (b) the adversarial images with desired domain labels so that they are classified as (c) the target images. The corresponding domain labels are black hair, blond hair, makeup, and eyeglasses from top to bottom. applications such as biometric authentication and public safety [Masi et al., 2018] . Since the recent success of face recognition systems rely on DNNs, a potential attacker could exploit adversarial examples to being recognized incorrectly or impersonate another person. Therefore it has significance to consider risks caused by adversarial examples against face recognition systems.
Typical methods to create adversarial examples for deceiving target classifiers is to add carefully crafted small perturbations on a source image [Szegedy et al., 2014; Carlini and Wagner, 2017] . To reduce the risks caused by adversarial examples based on the small perturbations, several defenses have been proposed in this literature with theoretical-certification. These defenses provide a lower bound of class changing perturbations based on global Lipschitz constant of DNNs [Cisse et al., 2017; Gouk et al., 2018; Tsuzuku et al., 2018] and randomized smoothing [Li et al., 2018; Cohen et al., 2019; Lecuyer et al., 2019] . These works indicate that the small perturbations-based attacks might be ineffective with these defenses anymore.
In spite of these certified defenses, there remains a significant risks caused by adversary. Song et al. and Brown et al. independently introduced a novel concept called unrestricted adversarial examples [Song et al., 2018; Brown et al., 2018] . While this type of adversarial examples are not restricted to small perturbations, they avoid confusing human observers. For instance, an image of a stop sign is still surely recognized as a stop sign by human observers though the adversarial perturbations are large enough to defeat certified defenses. These adversarial examples could be a serious security issue and have significance to shed light on the mechanism of this type of vulnerability.
In the context of face recognition systems, how can we define the unrestricted adversarial examples in a reasonable scenario? Spatial transformation such as adversarial rotation [Brown et al., 2018] and distortion [Goswami et al., 2018] are impractical scenario for attacks against face recognition systems since adversaries are unable to control the spatial transformations in biometric authentication and public surveillance (e.g. rotated images are unable to be presented in a scene of passport control). In this paper, therefore, we focus on the unrestricted adversarial examples without spatial transformation. We consider following conditions: our adversarial examples (1) should be perceptually realistic enough to maintain personal identity as an original image and (2) have large enough perturbations to defeat defenses based on small perturbations.
To obtain the unrestricted adversarial examples that satisfy the two conditions, we take advantage of recent image translation techniques for different domains. Our method enables us to translate facial appearance of a source image into several domains so that the face recognition systems could be deceived. While the translation provides perceptible perturbations on the face, it avoids to alter personal identity of a source for human observers. Figure 1 illustrates instances of our idea: (a) the original images are translated into (b) the adversarial images with respect to four attributes to be classified as (c) the target images. From top to bottom, we translate in four different domain labels: black hair, blond hair, makeup, and eyeglass. They show that changing hair-color or adding face accessories such as makeup and eyeglasses results in deceiving face recognition systems. Translating a given image into any desired facial appearance in this way enables us to evaluate the risk caused by diverse unrestricted adversarial examples.
In our experiments, we demonstrate that our method achieves about 90% of success rates in average against publically available face recognition models in VGGFace. We also show that our methods can generate realistic adversarial images with desired facial appearance and maintain personal identity while the perturbations are large. Finally, we extend our method to a black-box setting and evaluate black-box attacks based on transferability phenomenon.
Our contributions are listed as follows.
• We introduce a flexible and efficient method to provide unrestricted adversarial examples against face recognition systems.
• We confirm that generated adversarial examples are perceptually realistic enough to maintain personal identity in order to avoid confusing human observers.
• We demonstrate that our method can deceive face recognition systems with high attack success rates under a white-and black-box setting.
• We confirm that generated adversarial examples bypass state-of-the-art certified defense.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review related works about image translation methods based on GANs and adversarial examples in face recognition systems. In Section 3 we provide a detailed description about our method. In Section 4 we report the setting and results of our experiments. The conclusion of this paper is presented in Section 5.
Related works
In this section we review related works.
Unrestricted Adversarial Examples
Song et al. introduced a novel method to generate unrestricted adversarial examples from scratch in stead of adding small perturbations on a source image and demonstrated that their generated examples successfully defeated several certified defenses that assume small perturbations. In their framework, they adopted two classifiers: a target classifier that they wish to deceive and an auxiliary classifier that provides correct predictions. These classifiers encourage the generated examples from scratch to deceive the target classifier without changing any semantics. They confirmed that their method successfully created unrestricted adversarial examples without confusing human observer using AMTurk. While their work is remarkable, more efforts are required to deceive face recognition systems.
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs)
GANs have achieved significant results especially in fields of image generation tasks . They consist of two components: a generator and discriminator. The generator is trained to provide fake images indistinguishable from real ones by the discriminator while the discriminator is trained to distinguish fake images from real images. This competitive setting is represented by an adversarial loss.
Xiao et al. exploited the property of GANs to generate realistic adversarial images [Xiao et al., 2018] . In their method, the generator was trained to provide adversarial images indistinguishable from real ones by the discriminator. They demonstrated that their generated adversarial examples were perceptually realistic using human evaluation. In addition, the another prominent property of their method is that their generator provide adversarial examples efficiently once it is trained. This property could be beneficial to potentially improve the robustness of target models.
Choi et al. introduced a framework called StarGAN that enables us to translate an input image in multiple domains using GANs [Choi et al., 2018] . In addition to the conventional GANs, they introduced two loss functions: an auxiliary classification loss and a reconstruction loss. The first one is to guarantee that the output image can be classified into the corresponding domain label [Odena et al., 2017] . The second one is to preserve the content of the input image in the translated image as cycle consistency loss [Zhu et al., 2017] while StarGAN formulation consists of only a single generator. They demonstrated that StarGAN is useful to translate face images into any desired domains or facial expression in a flexible manner.
Deceiving Face Recognition Systems
Some works modify facial appearance of source images by adding adversarial face accessories and deceive face recognition systems for the purpose of impersonation or privacy preservation [Sharif et al., 2016; Sharif et al., 2017; Feng and Prabhakaran, 2013] . For instance, Sharif et al. proposed adversarial eyeglasses by iteratively updating color of them aligned onto subjects' face. Their proposed eyeglasses allow their subjects to impersonate another person with high attach success rates in several state-of-the-art face recognition systems. While these works demonstrated the significant risks caused by adversarial examples, their works have limited scalability to understand the mechanism of the vulnerability.
In this paper, we take advantage of recent literature in image translation with GANs to translate facial appearance of source images in an adversarial manner. This translation introduces large perturbations on the source images therefore translated images are unrestricted adversarial examples against face recognition systems.
Our Method
We first provide problem definitions and notations for our method. Then we introduce our formulation to translate hair color, makeup, and eyeglasses of subjects' facial images so that target face recognition models can be deceived to impersonate other persons.
Problem Definition
Given an instance (x i , y i , c i ), which is composed of a face image x i ∈ X sampled according to some unknown distribution, a class label y i ∈ Y corresponding to personal identity of the image, and a domain label c i that represents existence of each binary attribute. Here c i is a binary vector whose jth component is 1 when the corresponding image exhibit the j-th binary attribute. Target face recognition model learns a classifier φ : X → Y that assigns class labels into each face image. Our objective is to generate adversarial examplex i that is classified as φ(x i ) = t (t = y i ) where t is our target class label. In addition,x i should have the desired domain label. 
Formulation
Our formulation is mainly based on a framework of recent GANs. Figure 2 illustrates the overview of our method that consists of four components: a generator G, a discriminator D s , an auxiliary classifier D c , and a target model φ. The generator provides images indistinguishable for a discriminator by optimizing an adversarial loss L wgan . The generated images are encouraged to have any desired attribute labels by minimizing a classification loss L r cla , L f cla . Target loss L tar is minimized to deceive the target models (i.e. face recognition systems) for impersonation.
Adopted from StarGAN [Choi et al., 2018] we train a single generator to translate input face images into output images with any desired attributes. Here our generator takes a face image x and desired attribute label c out as an input and generates the output imagex whose attribute label is c out , G : x, c out →x. Our discriminator takes the generated imagex and provides a probability distribution over sources, D s (x). The goal of these components is to optimize the adversarial loss defined as:
where G tries to minimize the loss while D tries to maximize it to generate realistic images.
To take advantage of recent techniques for stabilizing GANs training, we adopt Wasserstein GAN with gradient penalty [Gulrajani et al., 2017] defined as:
where λ wgan represents a hyper parameter that controls magnitude of penalty term L pen . To enforce the Lipschitz constant, the penalty term is defined as:
where x q is sampled uniformly along straight lines between real and generated images. We set λ wgan to 10. To encourage the generated image to have the desired attribute label c out , we adopt the auxiliary classification loss [Odena et al., 2017] . Specifically, we optimize the discriminator D to classify the real images to corresponding attribute labels by minimizing the loss defined as:
where D c represents a probability distribution over the attribute label and c in corresponds to the attribute label of an input. Then, we optimize the generator G to classify the generated images to any target attribute labels by minimizing the loss defined as:
(5) Adopted from a common practice of image translation to keep original identity of the input images [Zhu et al., 2017], we add reconstruction loss defined as:
Note we adopt L1 norm to obtain less blurring images. We add loss to encourage the target model φ to classify the generated images as target labels t. This loss is defined as:
where z is output of the target model φ except final softmax layer (i.e. logits) and κ is a hyper parameter set to negative values in our experiments. Finally, our full loss function is defined as:
where we obtain our generator and discriminator by minimizing L G and L D respectively. Note λ α , λ β , and λ γ are hyper parameters that control the relative importance of each loss function.
Experiments Results
We first demonstrate that our method achieved more than 90% success rates against two target models in a white-box setting with high quality of images. Second we show that our method provided large perturbations beyond certified region given by the state-of-the-art certified defense [Cohen et al., 2019] . Finally we evaluate black-box attacks based on transferability phenomenon of adversarial examples [Papernot et al., 2016] .
Target Face Recognition Models
We built target face recognition models with VGG13 1 and ResNet50 2 based on publically available pretrained models called VGGFace [Parkhi et al., 2015] . These pretrained models exhibited the state-of-the-art results for face classification tasks. They take a 224x224 face image as an input and provide a low dimensional face descriptor where descriptors of two images in the same person are designed to be closer to each other. On top of the pretrained face descriptor, we constructed fully-connected layer to define our own target face recognition models with our dataset. We fine-turned the parameters from fully-connected layer using categorical cross entropy loss. 
Dataset
We applied the CelebA dataset that had 202,599 face images with 40 binary attributes [Liu et al., 2015] . To train the target face recognition models, we randomly selected 10 persons in the case A and 100 persons in the case B. In the training procedure, we only updated the weights of fully-connected layer on top of pretrained models with 20 images per each person. On images held aside for testing, we achieved high enough accuracy shown in Table 1 .
Implementation Details
We adopted a similar architecture from image translation literature [Zhu et al., 2017; Choi et al., 2018] . In particular, we constructed two down-sampling blocks, six residual blocks, and two up-sampling blocks with ReLU layer for the generator, and five down-sampling blocks with leaky ReLU and fully-connected blocks for the discriminator. We applied PatchGAN [Isola et al., 2017] to construct the discriminator following previous works in this literature.
We trained all models using Adam with β 1 = 0.5 and β 2 = 0.999. The learning rate was linearly decreased as [Choi et al., 2018] and batch size was set to 32 in all experiments. We use λ α = 1, λ β = 10 for L G and L D ,and κ = −0.3 for L tar . In the case A and B, we set λ γ to 0.2 and 0.5 respectively.
Attacks in a white-box
We first evaluated our method under a white-box setting where the adversary has access to model architecture and its weights that he or she is trying to deceive. Since we chose every person as targets of impersonation, we evaluated ten different generators and discriminators in the case A. In the case B, we randomly chose five persons among 100 as targets of impersonation. Our evaluation of attack success rates was performed using test dataset held aside from training of our models to perform fair evaluation.
Theoretically, we can apply 40 types of domain labels available in the CelebA dataset. In this paper, we only apply several domain labels: hair color (black/blond), heavy makeup, and eyeglasses since our goal is to efficiently generate images in practical scenario for attacking face recognition systems as [Sharif et al., 2016; Sharif et al., 2017; Feng and Prabhakaran, 2013] .
We report the average, maximum, and minimum attack success rates among different models in all the cases. Table 2 shows that our method achieved high attack success rates in all the models and domain labels. From the performance in Table 2 , we can see that about 90% of test images could be successful by changing their facial appearance. Table 2 : Average, maximum, and minimum attack success rates. Our generated adversarial examples achieved about 90% attack success rates in average against two models with different domain labels. VGG: VGG13. ResNet: ResNet50
Figure 3 presents successful adversarial examples against the VGG13 in the case A, the ResNet50 in the case A, the VGG13 in the case B, and the ResNet50 in the case B. Left columns show the original images and middle show the adversarial examples with several domain labels: blond/black hair, makeup, and eyeglass from top to bottom. The target images that we tried to impersonate are presented in the right columns. These images demonstrate that our method translate source images in multiple domains with high quality so that the target face recognition models could be deceived. Moreover, the introduced perturbations are perceptible for human observer while they avoid to altering identity of source images.
Human Perceptual Study
We evaluate quality of our generated images using Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) to confirm that the images satisfy the condition: (1) they should be perceptually realistic enough to maintain personal identity as an original image. We selected 100 pairs of original and adversarial images and ask workers a question: Does the two images have same personal identity? Note we assign each pair to five different workers for fair comparison. For the question, 81.4% of workers answered that persons in the original and the adversarial images are same identity. This result shows that our method successfully translate images with maintaining personal identity to avoid confusing human observers.
Attacks against Certified Defense
To validate the second condition: our adversarial examples have large enough perturbations to defeat defenses based on small perturbations, we evaluate state-of-the-art certified defense with scalability [Cohen et al., 2019] . The defense provides certified region where outputs of classifier is constant around each data point.
Setup.In our experiments, we construct smoothed target face recognition modelsφ which returns most likely class when x is perturbed as following:
where is Gaussian noise with the standard deviation σ and φ is a base classifier trained with Gaussian data augmentation [Lecuyer et al., 2019] . To compute the certified region, we used Cohen's method with n 0 = 100, n = 1000, α = 0.001 [Cohen et al., 2019] . Each certified region is represented by its radius: ball centered at each image with the radius is guaranteed to have constant output in it.
In our evaluation, we use VGG(A) and ResNet(A) trained with Gaussian data augmentation as the base classifier. The models is set to publically available pretrained parameters as initial parameter and trained by SGD with 1000 epochs. We use the learning rate is 0.0001 and the momentum is 0.9.
Result. Figure 4 shows certified accuracy of our smoothed target face recognition models with radius threshold T . The certified accuracy represents proportion of images classified correctly and its certified radius is less than T to all images. Table 3 : Average attack success rates in the transferability based attacks between two target face recognition models. About 30% of attacks transferred from VGG13 to ResNet50, and vice versa.
In both VGG13 (left) and ResNet50 (right), all certified radiuses are less than 630. We calculate the average perturbations in L2 of our method. The average perturbations for VGGFace(A) is 14739, 461290430, 3589136 for hair color, makeup, and eyeglasses respectively. The average perturbations for ResNet(A) is 15342, 461290700, 3589382 for hair color, makeup, and eyeglasses respectively. We confirm that all of our generated images provide larger perturbations than the certified radiuses. This result indicates that the state-of-the-art certified defense might be insufficient for our attack method. Note that this result does not mean the certified defense is broken, since the threat model is different from ours.
Attacks in a black-box
Since most of practical face recognition systems do not allow anyone to acquire knowledge about network architecture and its weights, it is significant to analyze the vulnerability in such a black-box setting. Here, we explored the attack strategies based on transferability phenomenon where adversarial examples generated in a source model will also lead to successful attack against other models [Szegedy et al., 2014; Papernot et al., 2016] . We generated adversarial images with the target face recognition model and evaluated the attack success rates against another one. Table 3 shows that the results of transferability-based attacks between two target face recognition models: VGG13 and ResNet50. We found that about 30% of attacks transferred from VGG13 to ResNet50, and vice versa. The results indicate that publically available face recognition systems are vulnerable to simple transferability-based attacks even without any knowledge about the models.
Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce a novel method to provide unrestricted adversarial examples against face recognition systems. The method translates facial appearance of a source image into multiple domains so that the target face recognition systems could be deceived. Through our experiments, we demonstrate that our method achieves about 90% and 30% attack success rates under a white-and black-box setting, respectively. We also demonstrate that perturbations introduced by our method is large enough to bypass state-of-the-art certified defense while the translation avoids to alter the personal identity of the source image for human observers. Finally, we conclude that our method is promising for improving robustness of face recognition systems in future.
